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I. INTRODUCTION 
When you look only at its statutory base, Swiss private construction law has not 
seen many changes since the Swiss Code of Obligations1 came into force on 
January 1, 1912. This view, however, does not hold true when you consider the 
many developments that have occurred elsewhere. For instance, the Swiss Society 
of Engineers and Architects (SIA)2 has continually published standard forms of 
contract that apply to a wide range of construction related services. Its 
standardised building contract (SIA-118, 1977/91) has seen unsurpassed success 
and is applied to a vast number of construction related contracts by both private 
and government entities.  
Major changes have also come about since 1996 with the enactment of extensive 
public procurement legislation. The new regulations have profoundly affected the 
way Swiss government bodies at all levels (federal, cantonal, and municipal) 
tender their contracts for works, services, and supplies. These changes were 
instigated by the WTO's Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), which 
Switzerland ratified on December 19, 1995. Although the GPA is only applicable 
above established thresholds, its implementation has triggered a complete 
overhaul of Swiss public procurement law. Occasionally, the new legislation has 
come under heavy fire. There is, however, no doubt that this fairly new body of 
                                                          
1  Swiss statutes are easily accessible through the federal government’s website 
(www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr). The entire body of statutory law can be read in either German, 
French, and Italian. As to the Swiss Code of Obligations (“CO”), which governs contracts for 
works (Arts 363 – 379 CO), English translations have been published by the Swiss-American 
Chamber of Commerce, most recently in 2002. 
2  For details visit the association’s website (www.sia.ch). 
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law is here to stay, which even its most ardent opponents will acknowledge.  
In order to assess the impact, to some degree, the Swiss federal administration has 
recently started to compile data about procurement practice. The administration's 
intention is to establish the groundwork for major adjustments. Even though 
intermediate findings are publicly available, it is too soon to make a prediction 
about the outcome of the undertaking at this time. Still, considering the 
unfortunate maze of pertinent rules and [132] regulations3, there is no doubt that 
some drastic measures will have to be taken to streamline this body of law. 
In addition to these developments, there are the decisions rendered by the Swiss 
Federal Court in Lausanne, the highest court in the country. This report will 
present some of the Court’s decisions pertaining to contract law and to public 
procurement law. The common starting point for these decisions is the Swiss 
Code of Obligations as well as other written statutes that may be applicable. 
However, the case law generated by the Swiss Federal Court constitutes a source 
of law in its own right that equals and sometimes even supersedes in practical 
significance its own statutory base. Hence, even though there is no room for the 
stare decisis rule in the Swiss legal system, careful analysis of the Federal Court’s 
judgments is of paramount importance for both legal practice and doctrine. 
In the year 2000, the Swiss Federal Court began (like many lower courts) to post a 
large number of its decisions on the internet (www.bger.ch).4 Up to then, 
relatively few selected decisions were published in the Court's official bulletins.5 
Practitioners and academic lawyers alike have started to ask themselves whether, 
under the applicable standard of professional care, they are required to be familiar 
with all of the cases that are now accessible through the Court's website. In the 
view of many, this burden would be overwhelming. Whether courts will share this 
sentiment and exercise restraint when judging professional negligence cases 
remains to be seen. 
II. CONTRACT LAW 
1. A leaking roof 
Contracts for building and other works are subject to Arts 363 et seq. of the Swiss 
                                                          
3  For an overview, see STOECKLI (Ed.), Das Vergaberecht der Schweiz (6th ed., Zurich 2004). 
4  Approximately 2,500 of the Federal Court’s decisions are published on the internet annually 
(TSCHUEMPERLIN, SJZ 99/2003, p. 270). 
5  For complete coverage of all officially reported decisions of the Swiss Federal Court relating 
to the Swiss Code of Obligations since 1874, see GAUCH/AEPLI/STOECKLI, Präjudizienbuch 
zum OR (5th ed., Zurich 2002). 
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Code of Obligations. In practice, however, works contracts are often subjected to 
SIA-118, 1977/91, a standard form of contract, which contains numerous 
modifications of and amendments to the statutory base.6 In BGE7 128 III 402 
(4C.258/2001), the Federal Court addressed various topics pertaining to the law of 
works contracts. Any report on recent Swiss case [133] law8 should not omit this 
landmark case.9 Of the significant issues examined by the Federal Court, I would 
like to elaborate on three of them. They all revolve around the contractor's 
obligation to remedy defects in the building works that he executed. The defects 
in this case consisted of leaks detected in a roof of an industrial facility. 
According to the Federal Court's reasoning and in line with Art 368(2) of the 
Swiss Code of Obligations, the employer can insist that any defects identified in 
the building work be remedied by the contractor. At his discretion, the contractor 
may completely re-execute the works unless this is adverse to the employer's 
interests (BGE 4C.80/2000).10 For his part, the employer is entitled to re-
execution only if the defects cannot be remedied in any other manner. One of the 
points that make this case note-worthy, is that the Court compelled the contractor 
to use a sealing material different from what had been specified in the contract. 
Apparently, there was no other way to get the job done. The specified material 
("Vatec Pur") was no longer available on the market, and only by using a 
substitute ("Sarnafil") could the leaks be properly sealed. From a legal 
perspective, this raises a question whether the contractor was not in fact put to 
perform something that had no basis in the contract. The Court held that this was 
included in the contractor’s duty to re-execute the works. 
The contractor's obligation to remedy defects at his own risk and cost has its 
limits. If the contractor's costs seem disproportionate when compared with the 
employer's interest, the contractor may refuse to perform any additional work (Art 
368(2) of the Code of Obligations). This reduces the employer's choice to either 
terminate the contract provided that the defects are sufficiently significant 
                                                          
6  The most comprehensive of the treatise on the law of works contracts is GAUCH, Der 
Werkvertrag (4th ed., Zurich 1996); see also BUEHLER, Zuercher Kommentar (1998) on Arts 
363 – 379 CO; KOLLER, Berner Kommentar (1998) on Arts 363 – 366 CO; ZINDEL/PULVER, 
Basler Kommentar (2003) on Arts 363 – 379 CO; CHAIX, Commentaire romand (2003) on 
Arts 363 – 377 CO. On the SIA standard form of contract for building works see GAUCH 
(ed.), Kommentar zur SIA-Norm 118, Arts 38 - 156 (Zurich 1992), and GAUCH, Kommentar 
zur SIA-Norm 118, Arts 157-190 (Zurich 1991). 
7  BGE is the abbreviation of Bundesgerichtsentscheid, which translates into Decisions of the 
Federal Court. 
8  For an extensive collection of recent Federal Court decisions as regards to works contracts 
see HUERLIMANN/SIEGENTHALER, Jusletter, 2 February, 2004.  
9  For further reading on this case see TERCIER/STOECKLI, Baurecht/Droit de la construction, 
2003, pp. 10 et seq. and 53 et seq.); HUERLIMANN/SIEGENTHALER, Jusletter, 17 March, 2003. 
10  This appears to correspond with German law, see 635(1) of the revised German Civil Code. 
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(Wandelung), or else to reduce the payment proportionally to the inferior value of 
the work (Minderung). In addition, he may claim damages if the contractor bears 
responsibility for the defects. In assessing whether the burden on the contractor is 
out of proportion, the initial contract price does not play any role whatsoever 
(BGE 111 II 173). This seems perfectly logical when one considers that the 
employer remains generally bound to fulfill his part of the contract.11 Rather, the 
sole controlling factor is the extent of the employer's interest in having the defects 
remedied. This interest has to be weighed against the costs of improving the 
building work. There is hardly any room to consider the financial burden placed 
on the contractor if core functions of the building are adversely affected by the 
defects. 
If the contractor fails to remedy any defects within a reasonable time, the [134] 
employer may at his discretion carry out the works himself or have them executed 
by others. The contractor has to cover the reasonable cost incurred by the 
employer and also bear the risk that goes with third-party performance. The 
contractor will not escape liability if he could have executed the improvement 
more cheaply. In fact, the contractor has to cover not only the expenditures, but 
also a reasonable fee which the employer owes to the third party. There is one 
more point of practical importance. The employer is entitled to an advance 
payment by the contractor. The amount due by the contractor has to be estimated 
based on the likely costs. The contractor may claim a deduction if he succeeds in 
convincing the Court that the work about to be performed will not merely remedy 
the defects, but produce additional advantages for the employer. For example, the 
enhanced longevity of a newly sealed roof might have to be taken into account 
here. 
There are some additional important caveats that safeguard the contractor's 
interests, as reaffirmed by the Federal Court in its recent decision BGE 130 III 
302 (5C.152/2003). First, the employer has to utilise the advance exclusively for 
the improvement of the building work, if he decides to use it at all. Secondly, the 
employer has to give a full account of his expenditures upon completion and 
refund the contractor any surplus. He may, on the other hand, claim additional 
payments if the advance was not adequate. Thirdly, the employer has to refund the 
advance payment in full if the work is not executed within a reasonable time.12 
These rules make it quite clear that advance payments are not designed to be used 
as a surrogate for damages. However, the employer may resort to setting off the 
                                                          
11  It is possible, however, that the employer is entitled to set off his own obligation against his 
claim of damages. 
12  It should also be noted that the employer owes interest to the contractor on the unused 
advance. 
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contractor's claim against his claim for damages (Art 120 of the Swiss Code of 
Obligations), and as a result refuse to refund the payments received. The Federal 
Court did not have to address what is to happen if the contractor is in default with 
the advance. In my view, if, as a result of the defects, there is imminent danger of 
extended damage, the employer will have to undertake all effective counter-
measures that may be reasonably expected from him. Apart from that, the 
employer is entitled to damages which he suffered as a consequence of the 
contractor's delay if there was negligence involved. 
2. Misplaced reliance 
BGE 130 III 345 (4C.230/2003) is the latest in a string of cases13 that have 
significantly expanded the so-called Vertrauenshaftung, which may be fittingly 
characterized as reliance-based liability. This relatively new type of liability 
requires neither a contractual relationship nor a tortious act, but, rather fills [135] 
gaps that are left open by both the law of contract and the law of torts. Its effect is 
one of expanding professional responsibility, welcomed by some, staunchly 
rejected by others. 
The latest Federal Court decision in support of this new doctrine resulted from a 
suit by a purchaser of real estate (the plaintiff) who was claiming damages from 
an architect (the defendant). The architect had been engaged by the previous 
owner of the property to appraise it for mortgage purposes. Two years later, this 
owner included the architect's original report in his sales documentation that he 
sent to the plaintiff without the architect's knowledge. The plaintiff claimed that 
the report failed to disclose some structural defects of the property, which reduced 
its value by some 63,000 Swiss francs. He argued that he had relied on the 
defendant's faulty valuation when he made up his mind to purchase the property. 
Based on this factual background, the Federal Court held that the purchaser's 
reliance was misplaced and thus rejected his claim. The decisive factor appears to 
have been that the architect had produced the valuation specifically for mortgage 
purposes and that he could not reasonably foresee that the report would also be 
utilised to inform potential buyers on the value of the property. The Court 
reasoned that under these circumstances, there was insufficient ground to assume 
a special relationship (rechtliche Sonderverbindung) between the purchaser and 
the architect. As a consequence, the Federal Court decided not to impose 
responsibility on the architect, which he himself had not assumed voluntarily. 
                                                          
13  Earlier cases include BGE 124 III 297, 121 III 350, and 120 II 331. The latter decision (the 
groundbreaking Swissair case) was the first one to address this new type of liability. On BGE 
130 III 345, see also HUERLIMANN/SIEGENTHALER, Baurecht/Droit de la construction, 
3/2004 (forthcoming), and Jusletter, 14 June, 2004. 
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I certainly believe that one should not argue with the Court about the outcome of 
this case. For future reference, however, one should bear in mind the Court's 
broad statement that a professional may be held liable by parties whose sole 
relation to her is that they relied detrimentally on her expert opinion. The Court 
did not state how this rule applies to professionals who do not act on their own 
account but are employed by a firm. It seems probable that the rule would apply to 
them as well, as a contractual relationship is not a prerequisite for this type of 
liability. In order to fend off reliance-based liability, one should consider a 
standard procedure of amending opinions with an express statement about the 
purpose and limitations thereof. This disclaimer should be as detailed as possible 
because a broadly worded standard clause might not be sufficient to defuse 
justified reliance. One could well fear that in the future such disclaimers might 
take up more space than the actual opinion. This just might be the price of 
broadened liability. 
3. A stolen suitcase 
In BGE 130 III 182 (4C.233/2003), the Federal Court dealt with a case which has 
on the face of it nothing to do with construction. The dispute before the Court was 
one between an organiser of package tours and one of its tourist customers. It 
arose because the customer’s suitcase had been stolen while it was being 
transferred from the tour bus onto a cruise ship. The customer [136] asserted that 
the organizer had not observed the proper standard of care when transferring her 
luggage. There would have been little room for dispute and I would not have 
chosen to include this case, had it not been for the exceptional value of the 
suitcase's contents, which the customer alleged to be well over 100,000 Swiss 
francs in jewels and clothes. The lower court ascertained that the customer had not 
advised the tour organiser specifically of this particular fact and, as a result, 
rejected her claim for damages. The customer appealed to the Federal Court, 
which upheld the lower court's decision. 
What takes this case beyond its particular factual context, is the reasoning of the 
Court. The federal judges found that a creditor generally has an obligation to 
notify the debtor if the object entrusted by him to the debtor has an exceptionally 
high value. The idea, obviously, is that proper notification enables the debtor to 
take appropriate steps to avoid the occurrence of an unusually significant loss. 
Only then does it appear fair to shift the risk of loss from the creditor to the 
debtor. 
There is no reason to think that the Federal Court would not apply this rule to 
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other cases as well, including construction cases.14 In fact, the Court has alluded 
to it in earlier decisions. As early as 1907, it found that the debtor could not be 
held liable if the creditor failed to notify him properly (BGE 33 II 426). And in 
BGE 109 II 238, it affirmed that the rule would apply if the creditor was the only 
one in a position to identify the risk of an unusually high loss. 
This seems to be an application of the general principles of fair risk allocation. 
Under these principles, the party better suited to identify a potential risk assumes 
the responsibility for taking the steps necessary to fend off that risk. Failure to do 
so is generally to this party's detriment. This idea is the foundation of other rules 
as well. An example is the duty of notification under Art 365(3) of the Swiss Code 
of Obligations, which reads as follows:  
"If, during the carrying out of the work, defects become evident in material 
supplied by the employer or with the designated construction site, or other 
conditions develop which endanger a due and timely carrying out of the work, the 
contractor shall without delay notify the employer thereof, otherwise he bears the 
adverse consequences himself."15 
With regard to works contracts, namely employers are thus well advised to 
disclose fully any unusual risks to the contractor. For example, where an employer 
is likely to suffer heavy financial losses if the works are delayed, he should 
carefully consider relaying this information to his contractor. If the employer 
decides not to notify the contractor, he may not be able to claim damages due to 
the lack of notification. 
There is, however, at least one innate limitation to this sweeping rule, as affirmed 
by the Federal Court. Under the Court's reasoning, notification is [137] not 
required if the risk is objectively discernible. In this case, the debtor will be liable 
for damages if he does not live up to the standard of care. 
In the future, the Court might and should limit the scope of its rule in two other 
instances. The first is when the debtor is in fact conscious of the risk even though 
it is not objectively manifest. Here it does not seem fair to let the employer bear 
the adverse consequences of the contractor's failure to take appropriate measures 
to protect the employer's interests. The second instance, is when the contractor is 
not in fact aware of the risk but has to bear responsibility due to the level of care 
to which he agreed to contractually. The assumption of the risk then forms part of 
the contract, which explains why the debtor will be held liable for any damages, 
                                                          
14  BECKER, Berner Kommentar (1941), Art 99 CO, para. 46; BRUNNER, Die Anwendung 
deliktsrechtlicher Regeln auf die Vertragshaftung (doctoral thesis Freiburg 1991), p. 104; 
GAUCH, Der Werkvertrag (4th ed., Zurich 1996), para. 1900; VON TUHR/PETER, Allgemeiner 
Teil des Schweizerischen Obligationenrechts (3rd ed., Zurich 1979), p. 112. 
15  See also GAUCH, Der Werkvertrag, (4th ed., Zurich 1996), para. 829 et seq. 
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however high, if all other requirements are met. 
III. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW 
To buy or not to buy ... a snowcat 
In BGE 129 I 410 (2P.155/2003), the Federal Court settled a hotly debated issue 
that is right on the crossroads of public procurement law and private contract law. 
The Court had to determine whether, under public procurement law, the tendering 
entity assumes an obligation to conclude a contract when and if it initiates award 
procedures or awards a contract. Although this case addressed a supply contract, 
its legal reasoning also applies to construction works contracts. 
The case was tried a total of three times by the lower court before it was submitted 
on appeal to the federal judiciary. It all started on 11 February, 2002, when the 
municipality of Tujetsch in the Swiss canton of Grisons advertised a contract for 
the purchase of a snowcat to maintain its slopes for cross country skiing. 
Subsequently, it obtained two bids from companies X and Y, respectively. Based 
on the evaluation of the two responsive offers, the municipality adjudget that the 
contract should go to Y for the amount of 156,000 Swiss francs, thus rejecting X’s 
offer, even though the latter's price was considerably lower (132,000 Swiss 
francs). X appealed to the Grisons administrative court, asking for this award to 
be set aside. This court found in X’s favor and ordered the municipality to re-
evaluate the two offers. The municipality, however, saw no reason to change its 
mind and re-awarded the contract to Y. This triggered yet another appeal by X. 
On 17 January, 2003, the administrative court set aside the municipality’s second 
decision and, without any further proceedings, awarded the contract to X. 
Roughly one month later, the municipality [138] of Tujetsch informed both 
bidders that it was no longer in a position to conclude a contract with either one of 
them. This decision was due to financial constraints that had occurred since the 
advertisement of the contract. X was not in any mood to accept this latest 
development and asked the administrative court to enforce its judgment. The court 
then ordered the council members representing the municipality of Tujetsch to 
conclude a contract with X, threatening them with criminal prosecution if they did 
not comply with the court’s order. Considering this bleak outcome, it was hardly 
surprising that the council members decided to try their luck with the Federal 
Court. 
The Swiss Federal Court found that the lower court’s third decision would not 
stand. Unlike the administrative court, it held that, from a public procurement 
perspective, the award of a contract does not create any obligation to subsequently 
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conclude a contract. The award merely vests the public entity with the authority to 
enter into a contract with the successful bidder if it decides to conclude a contract 
at all. There are no further legal effects beyond this one. In particular, the award 
does not create any entitlement to the successful bidder to force the public entity 
to enter into a contract with him. 
I should point out that under Swiss law the award of the contract and its 
conclusion have to be distinguished. This distinction was made in order to provide 
effective legal remedies in the public procurement arena. While a bidder may seek 
legal redress against an award decision, he cannot under normal circumstances 
bring an action to void the contract once it is concluded. This distinction concurs 
with a recent decision of the European Court of Justice, according to which  
“complete legal protection … requires that it be possible for the unsuccessful 
tenderer to examine in sufficient time the validity of the award decision. Given the 
requirement that the Directive have practical effect, a reasonable period must 
elapse between the time when the award decision is communicated to 
unsuccessful tenderers and the conclusion of the contract in order, in particular, to 
allow an application to be made for interim measures prior to the conclusion of 
the contract.”16 
The Tujetsch case draws heavily on this legal distinction between awarding the 
contract on the one hand and concluding it on the other. The significance of the 
case, however, lies elsewhere. When the Federal Court states that a public entity 
cannot be ordered to conclude a contract, it implies that the entity remains free to 
terminate an award procedure at will. But what, then, is the implication of article 
XIII of WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement? This article could be 
interpreted to mean that termination of an award procedure is only acceptable if it 
is “in the public interest”. It seems to me, however, that the Tujetsch case suggests 
something else. Under this interpretation, a public entity may discontinue an 
award procedure without having to justify its decision. There may be, however, 
grounds for requesting damages if termination suggests a violation of the general 
duty to act in good faith and/or the award procedure was initiated under false 




                                                          
16  Case C-212/02, Commission v Austria 
